When you sell as many computers as Dell does, all it takes is one small screw-up to create a security catastrophe. In this case, computers sold as far back as August of this year may have shipped with a compromised security certificate that could lead to a complete breach through a trivial exploitation of that certificate. So far, Dell has refused to disclose exactly which products are affected, but reports are confirming their Inspiron, XPS, Precision and Latitude lines are shipping with this problem. They are admitting that the problem exists, have published instructions on how to manually remove the compromised certificate, and will be releasing a software update to remove the certificate altogether. If you’ve purchased a Dell since Spring of this year, you should probably read on.
What this means for (some of) you:
In case the above didn’t contain enough technical jargon to convince you of how serious this is, let me unload on you: Dell shipped a slew of computers with a self-signed security certificate installed as a root trusted authority, and left the private encrpytion key on the devices. Even if you only understood part of that sentence, I’m betting you can intuit what publishing a private key does to the certificate. Yes, that’s right, it’s like sending everyone keys to your front door with your address printed on the key. Why this is a big deal is also fairly simple to explain. Because this key is essentially available for anyone to use, any reasonably proficient hacker could set up a fake hotspot at your local coffee shop, wait for a Dell computer to walk in, and then pretend to be Dell while unencrypting all of your network traffic. If that sounds bad, then you are picking up what I’m putting down. What do you do if you have an affected computer? Here are the instructions on manually removing the bad certificate, or wait for Dell to release a fix, which is schedule to arrive as of the time of this writing.
Full Disclosure: C2 Technology Partners, Inc. is a Dell Partner, meaning we sell Dell equipment and services, though after this particular goof, perhaps not as much as we had in the past.
Want to know more about security certificates? Here’s a reasonably straight-forward explanation of what they are and how they work.
Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo (IBM’s former hardware division) is making headlines this month, but not the kind that most companies covet. Until as recently as January 2015, Lenovo has shipped a large number of computers with pre-installed software from adware company Superfish. In and of itself, this isn’t an uncommon practice – hardware manufacturers commonly reduce manufacturing costs for their consumer products by striking deals with various companies who pay to have their software installed on brand-new computers. As initially reported by security researcher Marc Rogers, the Superfish partnership was a bad one for Lenovo, not only because the software itself was already notorious for being adware, but also because it compromises the built-in security of your computer’s SSL protocols to do its dirty work. Lenovo initially tried to downplay the problem, but pressure from the security community and the resulting media attention has since caused Lenovo to reverse its position 180 degrees. The CTO apologized in an open letter, and the company has issued a fix that completely removes the vulnerable software.
What this means for you:
Unless you are really into the technical details, the “what” and “how” of the Superfish vulnerability is much less important than the “why” and the “who”. In this case, we know why Lenovo installed Superfish – presumably they benefitted financially in some fashion. The real problem behind this fiasco is that Lenovo (a “trusted” brand – I use a Yoga 3 while I’m out seeing clients) missed the security flaws in this arguably useless piece of software and endangered thousands of its customers for no other reason than to make a buck. Can any hardware manufacturer be trusted to have our security in mind when making and selling their products? If the most recent NSA hard drive firmware scandal is to be believed, I’d say the answer is a resounding “no”. As we’ve seen with numerous other industries, when a company is held more accountable to shareholder profit (or “patriotic” duty?) than to consumer wellbeing, the only person we can trust is ourselves.
Unfortunately, manufacturers like Lenovo, Dell and HP have made a bed that is now very uncomfortable in which to lie. Their practice of installing “bloatware” on their equipment have driven prices down to a level that may be very difficult to maintain if they can’t lean on the dollars gained by these pre-installed software deals. At minimum, they’ll have to be much more discerning on what they pre-install, which, in turn, will drive up costs and narrow their margins even further.